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traceability is rarely the most efficient or best-targeted policy tool for stimulating market
development or ensuring the prompt removal of unsafe products from the food supply.
Mandatory programs may also result in the imposition of unnecessary costs on firms that
are already operating efficient traceability systems.
Failure in Food Markets May
Result in Inadequate Supply of Traceability
Firms have three distinct motives for establishing traceability systems: to improve supply-
side management; to differentiate and market foods with subtle or undetectable quality
attributes; and to facilitate traceback for food safety and quality. A firm may establish a
traceability system to achieve any number of these objectives, and as a result the private
sector has significant capacity for tracing. However, it is possible that firms do not supply
the socially optimal level of traceability in response to private market incentives.
Markets may fail to function properly if private costs and benefits are not the same as
social costs and benefits. In determining the efficient level and type of traceability system,
firms weigh the costs and benefits to themselves. If the costs and benefits at the margin
included in private firms’ calculations are the same as social costs and benefits, the market
supply of traceability will be optimal: the social net benefits of traceability systems will
be maximized. However, when markets fail, as when the benefits firms actually reap are
not equal to social benefits, the amount of traceback capacity may not be socially optimal.
Economic theory suggests a number of reasons why the private benefits of food
traceability may be less than the social benefits. First, problems associated with the fact
that food safety and quality are often credence attributes introduce the potential for market
failure. Credence attributes are those that consumers cannot evaluate even in use.
Consumers cannot usually discern before purchase, or even after consumption, whether a
food was produced with the best or worst safety procedures, or whether a food poses a
health risk. For example, consumers are unable to distinguish between raw ground beef
contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 and uncontaminated ground beef. Consumers are
unable to identify the contaminated meat by either appearance, smell, or price, and
therefore are unable to gauge the true value of the food.
When consumers cannot discern the true value of a product, producers who produce
high-quality or extra-safe products may not be able to successfully differentiate their
products from those of their lower-quality competitors and therefore will not be able to
benefit from their investments in food safety and quality. In fact, firms producing low-
quality food could charge high-quality prices and, because of their cost cutting, have
greater profits than high-quality producers. As a result, producers may have an incentive
to provide lower-quality, higher-risk foods. If this incentive is left unchecked, the market
equilibrium could result in the production of low-quality products with little or no product
differentiation (Akerlof, 1970).Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues E. Golan et al.
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Traceability systems may help firms overcome problems of asymmetric information
(where the presence or absence of an attribute is not something that can be detected by the
consumer). Traceability systems, particularly those certified by third-party verifiers, help
producers differentiate their products by providing evidence of quality or safety. For
example, traceability systems provide evidence that a piece of fruit was picked from an
organic farm or that a tuna was caught with a dolphin-safe net. Traceability systems can
also help minimize the distribution of unsafe or low-quality products and help producers
build a name for safety and quality. Producers marketing extra-safe, high-quality, or
niche-market products may reap benefits from a good traceability system in the form of
price premiums or expanded market share. When consumers pay a price equal to the costs
of the traceability system, firms’ private net benefits reflect social net benefits. In these
cases, the firms’ traceability systems can rectify the asymmetric information problem and
there is no market failure.
Producers who do not seek to differentiate their products have less incentive to invest
in traceability. Less traceability is sometimes an efficient private and social outcome:
consumers do not value the information generated by every traceability system. Probably
very few consumers would want to know if the corn in their corn chips was grown in
Illinois rather than Iowa or would be willing to pay for a system generating this type of
information. In some situations, however, consumers may have been willing to pay for
more information and better traceability systems. The potential for nondisclosure
problems arises when an entire product category has an undesirable characteristic that
cannot be changed appreciably. In these cases, no producer has an advantage in providing
information about the negative attribute because no producer can offer a superior
alternative.
The benefits to the firm of establishing traceability for credible product differentiation
may also be dampened by the very existence of partial disclosure and innuendo. In some
cases the possibility of deception may erode producers’ incentives to establish traceability
systems because widespread deception makes consumers doubt the veracity of claims
made by all producers, even honest producers. For some honest producers, the cost of
overcoming this high degree of consumer doubt will not be justified by the benefits.
As a result of the market failure problems described above, government regulators
may determine that the development of markets for high-quality or extra-safe food
products is inadequate. In these cases, policy makers may consider mandatory traceability
to expand consumer choice and protect consumers and producers from fraudulent quality
claims.
Though failure by private markets to supply adequate traceability for product
differentiation is a concern to regulators, an even bigger concern is failure by private
markets to supply adequate traceability for basic food safety control and monitoring. Food
traceability systems enable public health officials to identify the source of a foodborneCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues E. Golan et al.
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illness outbreak and trace the flow of the contaminated food throughout the food supply
system. When investigators trace diseases to their origin and contaminated foods are
removed from the food supply, illnesses can be prevented and lives saved. Though the
public sector maintains disease surveillance systems, investigators ultimately rely on
documentation maintained by private firms to trace the flow of inputs into final food
products and to track the distribution path of final food products throughout the retail
sector.
Firms have their own incentives to maintain traceback documentation to facilitate the
identification of the origin and distribution of safety problems. The better and more
precise the traceability system, the faster a firm can pinpoint the source of food safety
problems. Good traceability systems help minimize the production and distribution of
unsafe products, thereby minimizing the potential for bad publicity, liability, and recalls.
In some cases however, the amount of traceability supplied by firms may be less than
the social optimum because the social, public health benefits of traceability for food safety
are larger than the firm’s benefits. A firm’s traceability benefits comprise the reduction in
the potential for lost markets, liability costs, and recalls, while the potential social benefits
comprise a long list of avoided costs, including medical expenditures and productivity
losses due to foodborne illness, costs of pain and suffering, and the costs of premature
death. Social benefits may also include the avoided costs to other firms selling the same or
similar foods who might lose sales because of safety problems in the industry, even
though their products are safe. When a firm’s traceability benefits are lower than social
benefits, the firm will likely supply less traceability than warranted by social benefits.
The degree of traceability supplied by firms may also be lower than the social
optimum because firms may find value in some level of anonymity. If traceability systems
increase the probability that a firm will be identified in the case of food safety problems
and be exposed to liability, then the firm may have an incentive to underinvest in
traceability: the value of anonymity may reduce the firm’s incentive to invest in
traceability systems.
Market failure for traceability may therefore occur in two distinct areas: product
differentiation and food safety traceback. Asymmetric information problems may dampen
the development of differentiated markets for high-quality or extra-safe foods. The
divergence between the public health benefits of traceability and the benefits to private
firms may reduce private firms’ incentives to invest in traceability systems. These
potential sources of market failure may therefore prompt policy makers to consider
mandating traceability to achieve two objectives:
(i) expand consumer choice and protect consumers from fraud and
producers from unfair competition, and
(ii) increase the food system’s food safety traceback capabilities.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues E. Golan et al.
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Unfortunately, even in those cases where market failure may justify government
intervention to bolster markets and increase food safety, mandatory, systemwide
traceability is not a simple, inexpensive fix-all. In the sections below, we examine the
potential use and misuse of mandatory traceability in achieving the two policy objectives
outlined above.
Attribute-Specific Traceability May Expand
Consumer Choice and Protect Consumers from
Fraud and Producers from Unfair Competition
A well-targeted, mandatory traceability system may be necessary to encourage the
development of differentiated markets and protect consumers from fraud and producers
from unfair competition. The government may require that firms producing foods with
valuable credence attributes substantiate their credence claims through traceability
systems. However, mandatory traceability for all foods may not be the most efficient
mechanism for verifying quality claims for the subset of foods with credence quality
attributes valued by some consumers.
For example, a government may indeed have an incentive to require that producers of
food with valuable attributes, for example, non–genetically engineered foods, verify that
these foods actually are not genetically engineered, if the non–genetically engineered
attribute is of value to some consumers. However, no such verification would be
necessary for the genetically engineered foods currently on the market, because this
attribute is not of value to consumers (most biotech products currently on the market boast
attributes morel likely to be valued by the producer than by the consumer). A mandatory
traceability system for both genetically engineered and non–genetically engineered foods
is unnecessary to protect consumers from fraud or producers from unfair competition.
Such a system would raise costs without generating compensating benefits. Mandatory
traceability for product differentiation that is not targeted to specific attributes of value to
consumers will be costly and unnecessary.
Even in those cases where traceability systems are necessary to bolster market
differentiation and verify valuable credence attributes, the government may not need to
mandate a specific traceability template. Private firms operate a wide variety of complex,
highly sophisticated traceability systems. A government-mandated system that required
all firms to adopt the same template could be highly costly and inefficient. A flexible
government-mandated system would be more efficient and less burdensome. In the United
States, the proposed country-of-origin labelling law does not specify a traceability
template, but instead requires flexibility in the application of the program. With the 2002
Farm Act, retailers are required to inform consumers of the country of origin for beef,
lamb, and pork, fish and shellfish, fruits and vegetables, and peanuts. However, the act
specifically states that the Secretary of Agriculture shall not use a mandatoryCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues E. Golan et al.
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identification system to verify country of origin but may use certification programs
already in place.
In addition, though government mandated traceability may be warranted, direct
government administration of the traceability program may not be the most efficient
option. Private firms offer a number of services to help firms establish credible, reliable
traceability systems. In some cases, private firms will be able to offer more efficient, more
flexible supervision. For example, the U.S. national organic food standard depends on
private certifiers to provide flexibility to the system. Organic food certifiers, approved by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, work with growers and handlers to develop
individualized record-keeping systems to assure that traceability of food products grown,
marketed, and distributed is in accordance with national organic standards.
Mandatory Traceability is
an Inefficient Policy Option for Increasing
the Food System’s Food Safety Traceback Capabilities
Policy makers may consider mandatory traceability to increase the food system’s
traceback capability. However, since the government’s primary objective for food safety
traceback is the swift identification and removal of unsafe foods, other policy tools may
be more efficient than mandatory traceability. Policy targeted at providing firms with
incentives to establish efficient recall systems will be less costly to firms and consumers
and better targeted than policy mandating traceability.
Mandatory traceback may not be the most efficient policy tool because, like most
process standards, it precludes efficient innovation by firms by stipulating the method for
achieving the objective. Usually performance standards – rather than process standards –
ensure the most efficient compliance systems. With performance standards, such as
standards on pathogen contamination or recall speed, the individual firm chooses the most
efficient process to achieve a particular standard. For some firms, plant closure and total
product recall may be the most efficient method for isolating production problems and
removing contaminated food from the market. For other firms, detailed traceback,
allowing the firm to pinpoint the production problem and minimize the extent of recall,
may be the most efficient solution.
Process standards such as mandatory traceability require that firms adhere to a
common set of production or management systems, regardless of the size or technological
characteristics of the firm. As a result, process standards tend to be less efficient than
performance standards for achieving product standards. Likewise, mandatory,
government-monitored traceability is likely to be a less efficient mechanism for building
an efficient recall system than enforcement of recall and other food safety performance
standards.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues E. Golan et al.
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Currently in the United States, the two federal agencies responsible for food safety,
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), encourage firms to perform mock or simulated recalls to ensure that potentially
contaminated foods can be tracked and removed from the system in an expedient manner.
Third-party quality control certifiers often include timed mock recalls as part of their
safety audits. Any policy aimed at ensuring that foods are quickly removed from the
system, while allowing firms the flexibility to determine the manner, will be more
efficient than mandatory traceability systems.
Another way to put pressure on firms to develop good traceback is to increase the cost
and likelihood that if they sell unsafe food they will be caught and penalized. One method
to increase the likelihood that firms selling unsafe food will be caught is to improve public
surveillance capabilities. In the United States, federal government and other public health
officials have taken strides in building the infrastructure for tracking the incidence and
sources of foodborne illness.
The Foodborne Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet) combines active
surveillance for foodborne diseases with related epidemiologic studies to help public
health officials better respond to new and emerging foodborne diseases. FoodNet is a
collaborative project of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), nine
states, the USDA, and the FDA. Another network, PulseNet, based at CDC, connects
public health laboratories in 26 states, Los Angeles County, New York City, the FDA and
the USDA to a system of standardized testing and information sharing. PulseNet helps
reduce the time it takes disease investigators to find and respond to foodborne outbreaks.
Both FoodNet and PulseNet differ from passive surveillance systems that rely on
reporting of foodborne diseases by clinical laboratories to state health departments, which
in turn report to CDC. Under passive information gathering, only a fraction of foodborne
illnesses are routinely reported to CDC.
With better surveillance, regulators are able to increase the likelihood that unsafe
foods and producers of these foods will be identified. If identified, it is more likely that
these firms will bear some of the costs of unsafe production, including recall, liability, and
bad publicity. Increased surveillance therefore increases the potential costs of selling
unsafe food, providing producers with increased incentive to invest in safety systems,
including traceability systems. Beefed-up traceability systems not only help firms avoid
distribution of unsafe product, they also help firms minimize the cost of recall. The better
and more precise the traceability system, the smaller the recall size, and the less expensive
the recall. If firms expect more recalls, they will have the incentive to improve their
traceback systems to reduce the cost of recall.
In fact, any policy that increases the probability and cost of getting caught selling
unsafe food may provide producers with incentives to increase their traceback
capabilities. Policies strengthening recall authority, food safety performance standards, orCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues E. Golan et al.
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liability could potentially encourage both development of more efficient systems for the
swift removal of unsafe foods and investment in safer food systems – which is the
ultimate objective of the public health sector.
Mandatory, Systemwide Traceability is Costly and Inefficient
raceability is not a panacea for problems related to insufficient product
differentiation or food safety traceback capacity. Mandatory traceability is usually an
inefficient policy option that is rarely the best policy tool. Even in those cases where
traceability is necessary for the development of differentiated markets, mandatory
traceability often misses the mark. Systems that include attributes that are not of value to
consumers generate costs without any corresponding benefits. Only systems that focus on
attributes of value to consumers actually facilitate market development.
Mandatory traceability systems for food safety may be poorly targeted. Policies
targeted at providing firms with incentives to establish efficient recall systems will likely
be less costly and more successful than policy mandating traceability. Such policies
include the following: recall and other food safety performance standards; any policy that
increases the likelihood that producers of unsafe food will be identified and punished; and
any policy that increases the punishment for producing and selling unsafe foods.
Even if mandatory systems prove to be the best-targeted policy option, heavy-handed
application of mandatory systems could negate the benefits. Private firms have developed
many sophisticated tracking systems for quality control and supply-side management.
Paradoxically, the widespread voluntary adoption of traceability complicates the
application of mandatory systems. Mandatory systems that prescribe one traceability
template and fail to allow for variation across systems are likely to impose costs that are
not justified by efficiency gains. The characteristics of an efficient traceability system will
vary from industry to industry and firm to firm. Mandatory systems that fail to allow for
variation will impose unnecessary costs on firms that are already operating efficient
traceability systems.
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1 The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official
USDA positions.